A surprising connection on the professional network. A proposal of work from a headhunter, most likely a female agent, operating from the Asian nation. The chance to make around £20,000 part-time preparing a handful of political analyses for a Chinese company containing “non-public” or privileged information. Compensation in cryptocurrency or cash favored.
It might appear clear, on this telling, that something about this approach would be suspicious. However, Beijing's powerful intelligence agency continues to view it valuable to deploy recruitment consultants to attempt this – prompting the domestic spy agency to issue multiple warnings about their activity on the internet.
Large-Scale Contact Attempts on Professional Networks
Last year, the head of MI5 the agency's director stated operatives from China were approaching UK citizens on LinkedIn on an extraordinary scale, at a frequency of 10,000 over the previous two and a half years, seeking governmental, commercial, military and technological classified information. But a new initiative aimed at politicians and Westminster has led the spy agency to take further action.
A spying alert was issued on Tuesday via the offices of the Commons speaker and his House of Lords counterpart: a single slide after the persistent attempts of certain individuals and other operatives to reach out to Members of Parliament, peers, their assistants, economic experts, thinktanks – anybody who might become a source.
Intelligence Strategy and Legal Changes
In the curious manner of British intelligence, there was no publication of the security advice from MI5 or the interior ministry. But the agency knew its briefing note would become public once it was emailed out to parliament. Sharing it in the media assists the wider public more easily recognize interactions with a deceptive purpose.
The alert has the effect of uncovering additional details from in and around Westminster, though that is not MI5’s main objective. The agency wants public figures to understand that just because interactions on professional networks are not as toxic as on X or Facebook, it doesn't imply they are without risk.
Nor is domestic spy agency understood to have been responding to a particular event in parliament, although the recent actions occur after the embarrassing collapse of the legal case of a former parliamentary aide Christopher Cash and his friend Christopher Berry on a technicality earlier in the autumn.
The two had been charged of spying for China – a allegation they denied – but inability to complete a trial under the now repealed Official Secrets Act led to concerns that British democracy had been left unprotected.
Revised Laws and Beijing's Long-Term Interests
The law has now been changed, and the MI5 slide contains a note of its successor: “Those engaging in spying operations face substantial criminal penalties under the new security law.” It is a crime if somebody participates in conduct that is or is likely to “significantly help a foreign intelligence service”.
A natural question, though, is what China has to gain. A politician who is outside ministerial roles will have limited knowledge of classified material, and an contact of theirs even less. But the Chinese government is particularly focused in the legislative body: for a period, in 2020 and 2021, the UK’s approach to China on issues such as Huawei or the Uyghur repression or alleged atrocities was being influenced by parliamentarians.
Cultural Differences and Persistent Cyber Risks
To a degree there are distinct approaches as well. Authoritarian governments like China’s export intelligence collection methods and the size of its spy network is enormous, employing 300,000 individuals. A former US official, a US national cyber director under president Joe Biden, said it was sometimes estimated that “the Chinese have greater linguistic capacity engaged in this than we [western intelligence] have English speakers”.
The Chinese government is willing to cultivate contacts over the extended period and at times even the intelligence services have struggled to differentiate genuine connections and espionage. “China has a minimal requirement for which details is deemed to be of value,” security minister a government official told MPs on Wednesday, but a sudden turn in the government situation may result in someone rapidly peripheral turning important.
Another way to consider the continuous efforts at secret information gathering is in the broader framework of the geopolitical contest between China and the Western nations at a level under the point of outright war. China has increased its hacking efforts, with the one campaign infiltration of phone and data networks in 80 countries, and the Volt Typhoon breach of countless connected equipment.
Beijing is involved in persistent attempts to find secret informants on UK politics online because it seeks to be provocative, to display power and because it has the capability.